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Ulrich Meyer’s fascinating book The Nature of Time uses a novel devel-
opment of Arthur Prior’s tense logic to argue for a ‘modal’ account of time.
Meyer’s metaphysical view requires tense primitivism (the view that truths are
irreducibly tensed) and so, in Quine’s turn of phrase, trades ontology for ide-
ology. Meyer’s temporal metaphysics eschews ontological commitment to tem-
poral instants through the introduction of so-called ‘ersatz times,’ developed in
analogy with the ersatz possible worlds of modal logic.
In modal logic, linguistic ersatzism about possible worlds is associated with
actualism (the thesis that only actual objects and events exist) so one might
expect an advocate of ersatz times to endorse presentism (the thesis that only
present objects and events exist). Many philosophers of physics (myself in-
cluded) take presentism to be inconsistent with special relativity. Meyer, how-
ever, argues that the analogy between presentism and actualism is weak, and
denies the presentist’s claim that the present is metaphysical privileged. Fur-
thermore, Meyer claims that relativity allows for the introduction of ‘hybrid
views’ that combine distinct, seemingly incompatible metaphysical accounts of
time and space. In particular, Meyer advocates a metaphysics of relativistic
spacetime that combines spatial substantivalism with his ‘modal’ view of time.
The argument of the book follows an almost Aristotelian methodology. First,
in Chapter 1, the desiderata for a theory of time are outlined. Next, rival meta-
physical theories are dismissed one by one: varieties of temporal relationalism in
Chapter 2, and temporal substantivalism in Chapter 3. Then the preferred the-
ory is outlined (in Chapters 4, 6 and 8) and declared the victor, with the rest of
the book devoted to showing how remaining difficulties may be accommodated.
In particular, there are chapters that deal with temporal propositions and truth-
makers (Chapter 5), temporal structure (Chapter 7), presentism (Chapter 9),
becoming (Chapter 10), motion (Chapter 11) and relativity theory (Chapter
12).
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There is much to admire about Meyer’s book: aside from the novel meta-
physical view advocated within, this elegantly slim volume contains authorita-
tive discussions of—if not all then an immodest subset of—the key issues in
contemporary philosophy of time. I will, however, take issue with two claims
in particular: first, that Meyer’s novel argument against temporal relationism
rules out Russell’s theory of time; it does not. Second, that hybrid views provide
a sensible and robust approach to the metaphysics of time in relativity theory.
Before that, let’s delve into some of the details of Meyer’s theory of time.
Meyer, who rejects substantial times (as exemplified by Newton’s Absolute
Time) as “ontologically extravagant” (p. 28), aims to give an account of instants
of time in terms of sets of sentences of tense logic, that is ersatz times. In so
doing, Meyer hopes to limit his metaphysical commitments to just the tense
operators and axioms of a minimal tense logic—to temporal ideology alone.
This trading of ontology for ideology is, for Meyer, the main attraction of his
view:
The advantage of the times-as-sets view is that it preserves the onto-
logical frugality of tense primitivism. It provides the needed referents
for dates without incurring commitment to temporal propositions,
temporal parts, metaphysically basic time points, or any other rec-
ognizably temporal entities. (p. 66)
However, nowhere does Meyer explain why it is such a good idea to eschew
any recognizable temporal ontology, other than the vague claim that “[t]heories
with fewer ideological and ontological commitments are usually thought to be
preferable” (p. 3)—by whom, and why?
The closest Meyer comes to an official answer (in Chapter 1) is that the
best theory of time will (i) solve the Problem of Change, (ii) mesh well with
physics, and (iii) accord with ordinary ways of speaking about time, all with
a minimum of ontological and ideological commitments. In reverse order: By
design, a ‘modal’ theory of time scores highly when it comes to modeling our
ordinary tensed temporal discourse. However, despite his best efforts, I will
argue that Meyer’s project does not mesh as well with spacetime physics as he
would have us believe. Finally, the Problem of Change
is the task reconciling the possibility of change with the Indiscern-
ability of Identicals. An object [a] experiences change just in case it
possesses some property K at one time that it lacks at another. (p.
4).
That is, a experiences change if and only if the following is true: a is K and a
is not K. This apparent contradiction must be avoided by a theory of time.
Equipped with an ontology of substantial times the resolution of the paradox
is clear: a is K at time t and a is not K at time t′, with t 6= t′. However, in
Chapter 3, Meyer argues that things are not so simple and the introduction of
substantial times causes more problems than it solves. Meyer’s ‘modal’ theory
approaches the problem differently. Taking his cue from natural language, in
which
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we cannot attribute a property to an object without committing
ourselves, by our choice of tense, to a past, present, or future time
at which the object possesses that attribute[,] (Meyer, 2013, p. 37)
Meyer endorses the property-time link—the idea that truths about objects come
irreducibly tensed.
The core idea of Meyer’s project is that, by taking objects and tensed prop-
erty attributions as fundamental, the property-time link allows him to recon-
struct the times needed to solve the Problem of Change without a commitment
to an ontology of times. Instead, Meyer’s view of time relies on a timeless ontol-
ogy of objects and properties,2 from which a non-trivial ideological commitment
to tense logic allows him reconstruct an ersatz time series of ‘possible presents.’
To see how this works we need some details of tense logic.
Tense logic is nothing new, and it was originally introduced by Prior (1957)
through an analogy with modal logic (hence the idea of a ‘modal’ theory of
time). Taking the models as our starting point, a possible world semantics
for modal logic builds on propositional logic in the following way. We begin
with a set of atomic sentences A,B,C, . . . of a formal language L. A model
for propositional logic is a valuation, v, which assigns either ‘true’, v(ϕ) = T ,
or ‘false,’ v(ϕ) = F , to every sentence of the language, ϕ ∈ L. Modal logic
introduces a set of worlds, W, each of which is a model of propositional logic.
Tense logic replaces this set of worlds with a set of times, T, each of which
corresponds to a model of propositional logic in the same way. That is, each
time t ∈ T is a valuation, vt, of the language L.
Aside from the usual logical connectives ‘not’ (¬) and ‘implies’ (→), modal
logic introduces a necessity operator () and a possibility operator (♦). In tense
logic, these operators have an interpretation in terms of times: necessary means
true at all times and possible means true at some time. However, tense logic
aims to model tensed temporal discourse so is based instead on two ‘possibility’
operators which distinguish between past and future: ‘It was the case that’ (P)
and ‘It will be the case that’ (F). As a result, tense logic comes equipped with
two ‘dual’ operators that play the role of necessity: H := ¬P¬ and G := ¬F¬.
A model for Meyer’s minimal tense logic Z (for Zeitlogik) is a triple 〈T, <
, p〉, where T is a set of time-indexed models of propositional logic, < is a
relation between times (the ‘earlier-than’ relation), and p ∈ T is a particular
time chosen as ‘the present’ (in modal logic, this would be a possible world
chosen as ‘actual’). A sentence ϕ is true at a time t iff vt(ϕ) = T . We can now
give a semantics for these tense operators as follows:
Pϕ is true at t iff ∃t′ such that t′ < t and vt′(ϕ) = T .
Hϕ is true at t iff ∀t′ such that t′ < t, vt′(ϕ) = T .
Fϕ is true at t iff ∃t′ such that t < t′ and vt′(ϕ) = T .
Gϕ is true at t iff ∀t′ such that t < t′, vt′(ϕ) = T .
2This is made quite explicit in Meyer’s development of a quantified tense logic (in Chapter
8) in terms of a tenseless domain of objects.
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Furthermore, a sentence ϕ is true simpliciter iff it is true at the present time p.
A few remarks here will serve to introduce the details of Meyer’s project.
First, the interpretation of the tense operators above introduces an explicit
quantification over times, which by Quineian strictures incurs an ontological
commitment. It is precisely this ontological commitment that Meyer hopes to
avoid through (i) the replacement of times by ersatz times and (ii) a commit-
ment to tense primitivism, the idea that tense operators are conceptually basic.
In sum, Meyer wants P and F left uninterpreted so that he can build up an
interpretation of the time series (given by ersatz times) in terms of P and F,
rather than vice versa. Having done so, he introduces an object language that
allows for quantification over the ersatz time series, which allows P and F to be
interpreted as above, replacing times with ersatz times. In this way, he avoids
ontological commitment to substantial temporal instants.
Second, Meyer’s commitment to a minimal tense logic takes pains to avoid
making any particular assumptions about the (ersatz) time series. In reading
the interpretation above it would be easy to assume that the times T are ordered
by < as if they were elements of the real line, but this is far from necessary:
models of Z exist in which the time series branches (in which case the relation
< is not comparable), or has endpoints, or is not dense, or is discrete. Indeed,
the relation < need not even form a (strict) preorder on T since models of
Z exist in which it is not transitive. Each additional condition on the time
series corresponds to an additional axiom of the tense logic. By restricting his
ideological commitments to just the minimal axiom set Z, Meyer hopes to secure
a priori status for our knowledge of the nature of time and apparently he regards
the theorems of Z as analytic truths, i.e. true by definition (pp. 47–48).
Third, philosophical criticism of tense logic has often involved showing that it
is not fit for (its original) purpose as a formal account of the uses of verb tense in
natural language. By presenting sentences in English that cannot be expressed
in tense logic without the introduction of further operators (such as Kamp’s
‘A child was born which would be king’) it has been argued that a sufficiently
expressive tense logic must ultimately rely on quantification over times (Massey,
1969; van Benthem, 1983). In essence, the complaint is that tense logic is a
mere notational variant of a classical temporal logic that merrily quantifies over
an ontology of times. Meyer’s answer to this is, again, the introduction of
quantification over an ersatz times series, which allows for any such sentence to
be meaningfully expressed without quantification over (substantial) times and
without the introduction of further tense operators.3
So the idea of an ersatz time series is crucial to Meyer’s positive project,
which he calls linguistic ersatzism about time (in analogy with ersatzism about
possible worlds). Meyer defines a possible present p as a maximal consistent
sets of sentences4 of the tense logic Z (which includes negation (¬) and ma-
3However, as Meyer (p. 65) notes, the quantification over ersatz times cannot be eliminated
to produce a sentence involving just P and F.
4A set of sentences is maximal if it contains either ϕ or ¬ϕ for every sentence in the
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terial implication (→), as well as P and F). Choose some possible present
p = {Pϕ,Fϕ,FPϕ, . . . } to be the actual present. Because the set of sentences is
maximal consistent, p provides plenty of information about the past and future
as well as the present. The trick is to use that information to define an entire
(ersatz) time series.
To avoid reference to times, Meyer (p. 61) now defines ‘true at’ in terms of
sentences:
A sentence ϕ is true at a set of sentences S iff ϕ ∈ S.
This provides an interpretation of ‘earlier-than’ and ‘later-than’ in terms of the
tense operators rather than the other way around:
S′ < S iff Fϕ ∈ S′ whenever ϕ ∈ S.
S′ > S iff Pϕ ∈ S′ whenever ϕ ∈ S.
Remarkably, Meyer (2009) proves that whenever a possible present p contains a
past (resp. future) tense sentence Pϕ (Fϕ) there exists a possible present t such
that ϕ ∈ t and t < p (t > p).
Any claim made by a possible present regarding the past or future, then, is
backed up by the existence of a possible present at which that claim is true. To
construct an ersatz time series we take these possible presents, nested inside p
like Russian dolls, and string them together one after the other. More formally,
each possible present p defines a ersatz time series Tp which includes all and
only those possible presents which can be reached from p via a connected string
of possible presents. Crucially, if q is another possible present such that q ∈ Tp
then Tq = Tp. Furthermore, each possible present p defines a model of tense
logic 〈Tp, <, p〉 in which all and only the sentences of p are true, and conversely
each model of tense logic defines a possible present (Meyer, 2013, p. 62).
This reconstruction of a time series from sentences of tense logic forms the
core of Meyer’s positive project, which he takes to be a theory of time on a
par with Russell’s relationist theory of time. The contrast between the two is
instructive since both aim to avoid commitment to instants of time by means of
logical constructions. Russell (1936), inspired by A. N. Whitehead, attempted
a reconstruction of the time series (i.e., a set of temporal instants structured
like the points of the real line) from a class of temporally extended events with
two relations defined on them: overlap (◦) and complete temporal precedence
().
Regardless of the success of this project (the history of which is recounted by
Meyer, pp. 8–13), its ontology is clear: there exists a class of events and relations
on those events, and time is nothing but an ordered collection of classes of events.
The contrast between Russell’s relational theory of time and Meyer’s ‘modal’
theory of time can be drawn in two directions. In terms of ontology: Russell
relies on the existence of events and their relations; Meyer on the existence
language ϕ ∈ L.
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of objects and their properties. In terms of ideology: Russell eschews tense
altogether; Meyer relies on it.
One respect in which Meyer thinks he has the advantage is that the rela-
tionist must assume that the actual course of events has particular structural
characteristics in order to construct a time series, whereas the minimal tense
logic Z makes no assumptions about whether the time series is discrete or con-
tinuous, is linear or branches, etc. It seems to me, however, that the relationist
is free to pursue alternative schemata in the same manner, viz., as ways that
the time series could have been, but isn’t. Just as Meyer’s ideological commit-
ment is held fixed between these possible (ersatz) time series, so too could the
relationist’s ontological commitments be maintained while exploring alternative
possible event structures.
In terms of overall metaphysical parsimony, then, it is hard to see which
has the advantage, and it seems that Meyer finds temporal relationism quite
attractive; certainly he prefers it to substantivalism. In the book, what settles
the case in favour of Meyer’s theory is a new argument against relationism. But
this argument is far from the knock-out blow that Meyer takes it to be.
The argument begins with a discussion of the difficulties in maintaining that
events can be both metaphysically complex and the primary occupants of the
time series. Essentially, the worry is that if events are defined in terms of
their time of occurrence or spatio-temporal location then they cannot serve as
the ingredients of the relationist’s recipe for constructing times. This difficulty
was resolved by Russell in taking events and their temporal relations to be
metaphysically basic (see Meyer, pp. 14–17). The further difficulty raised by
Meyer is that the temporal relationist still owes us an account of the relationship
between objects and events. Here’s the difficulty, as he sees it:
If events are the primary occupants of the time series then material
objects relate to times only indirectly, by participating in events that
stand in temporal relations to one another. (p. 17, original emphasis)
Meyer argues that in attempting to give any account of participation (i.e.
the supposed relation that objects bear to events) the temporal relationist en-
counters what he claims is a fatal dilemma: either the account is so restrictive
as to rule out participation tout court, or it involves treating events as meta-
physically complex. Since the temporal relationist cannot take the second horn,
she must take the first. But then, complains Meyer,
we have nothing plausible to say about how ordinary material objects
relate to time. And if we have no account of the relation of material
objects and time then we have no account of what it is for an object
to have a property at a time, and thus no solution to the Problem
of Change. [. . . ] Event-relationism about time is untenable. (pp.
19–20)
This conclusion, however, only follows if we assume that there is indeed a
relation of participation connecting objects and events of which the temporal
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relationist owes us an account. If, for example, our relationist denied the in-
dependent existence of material objects by maintaining a strict event ontology
then there could be no expectation of giving an account of participation in terms
other than events and their relations. Furthermore, when it comes to ontologi-
cal parsimony, a temporal relationist who is also an event ontologist would have
an advantage over the event-relationist that Meyer considers.
But this event ontologist is far from hypothetical: this was precisely Russell’s
position during the period we are interested in here. From 1927 onward, Russell
adopted an event ontology, according to which objects can be analyzed without
remainder into events. That is, in Russell’s event ontology, ‘material objects’—
understood as comprising a metaphysical category distinct from events—do not
exist.
In the same way that the temporal relationist proposes a reductive analysis
of times in terms of inter-related events, so the event ontologist proposes that
material objects—electrons, protons, atoms and the like—are nothing but col-
lections of inter-related events. Regardless of whether or not the reduction was
successful, there can be little doubt that this was Russell’s intention:
Electrons and protons [. . . ] are not the stuff of the physical world:
they are elaborate structures composed of events, and ultimately of
particulars. (Russell, 1927, p. 386).
Russell’s reductionist (or eliminativist) intent regarding persisting objects is
made particularly clear in his critical discussion of Whitehead (1925), who views
spatio-temporally located events as mere aspects of a single persisting thing.5
Russell objects to this view “on purely logical grounds” as follows:
Given a group of events, the evidence that they are “aspects” of one
“thing” must be inductive evidence, derived from perception [. . . ]
in calling two events “aspects” of one “thing,” we imply that their
likeness is more important than their difference; but for science both
are facts, and of exactly the same importance.6 (Russell, 1927, p.
248)
The idea appears to be this: the series of events that seem to us to compose
a single material thing are nevertheless numerically distinct and so cannot be
regarded as the aspects of the same thing, on pain of logical contradiction. This
is, in effect, to take the Problem of Change as an argument against the claim
there exist persisting material objects, self-identical at every time they exist.
An event ontologist can hardly be expected to give an account of how non-
existent persisting material objects can come to possess contrary properties at
distinct times. However, Meyer may still object that this is no solution to the
5I include this discussion in particular because Whitehead is cited by Meyer (p. 17) as a
temporal relationist who introduces a notion of participation (called ‘situation’ by Whitehead).
6See also Russell’s discussion of Whitehead in relation to the objects of perception (pp.
144–152).
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Problem of Change. But since Russell identifies what we would think of as a
material object—a “thing”—with a series of events the solution is straightfor-
ward: a is nothing but a series of events (i.e. concrete particulars of limited
spatial and temporal extent) some of which are K and some of which are not
K.7 There is no potential for logical contradiction lurking here: these events
are numerically distinct and the Indiscernability of Identicals simply does not
apply.
At best, Meyer’s argument establishes that the temporal relationist must be
a strict event ontologist. But since the relationist already accepts events into
her ontology, what is the cost? Even by Meyer’s own criteria things are looking
quite good: in terms of physics, Russell’s (1927) event ontology was motivated
by consideration of general relativity; and Donald Davidson, the most promi-
nent event ontologist of recent times, used event predication to give an account
of adverbial modification in natural language (Davidson, 1980). At most, Meyer
could complain about the lack of reference to “ordinary material objects,” and
the promissory status of a reduction of those objects and their spacetime loca-
tions to events and their relations—far from a knock-down refutation.
But Meyer’s own ontology, and the resulting account of the nature of time,
is hard to grasp. What exists, according to Meyer’s metaphysics (as outlined
in Chapter 8), is what lies in the domain of a quantified tense logic from which
times have been eliminated in favour of ersatz times. Now I don’t mean to
suggest that this metaphysic is incoherent so much as vastly underspecified. For
example, it is compatible with both substantivialism about space (according
to which spatial points exist and material objects occupy those points) and
relationism about space (according to which only material objects exist and
space is to be given in terms of their relative positions).
Meyer rejects spatial relationism in favor of spatial substantivalism (in Chap-
ter 3) but fails to consider the relationist re-casting of classical physics by Bar-
bour and Bertotti (1982), which provides the means to resist Meyer’s arguments
in favour of substantial points. As detailed consideration of Barbourian physics
shows (Belot, 1999; Pooley, 2001; Pooley and Brown, 2002), there is no explana-
tory gap here regarding inertial effects (which are accommodated along Machian
lines), nor special difficulties concerning classical fields (which can be recast in
terms of relationally specified field configurations).
Given Meyer’s rejection of both temporal ontology and intrinsic metrical
structure (on p. 75), this strikes me as a missed opportunity: the latter of these
corresponds to what Barbour (1982, p. 260) calls the Second Mach’s Principle,
and there is a close resemblance of Meyer’s possible presents to Barbour’s ‘time
capsules.’ Barbour (1999) defines a time capsule as a “static configuration that
appears to contain mutually consistent records of processes that took place in
a past in accordance with certain laws” (p. 31). This leads him to hope that
all appearances of time will have been reduced to a common basis:
7This is essentially Russell’s definition of motion (Russell, 1927, p. 246).
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special structure in individual Nows. [. . . ] The inference that [the
time line] exists can emerge from a single Now. The instant is not
in time—time is in the instant. (Barbour, 1999, p. 34)
As Ismael reflects:
Moments, in this picture, are elements of a grand configuration
space, like the worlds in Lewis’ modal universe; there is no time-
like dimension constituted by them collectively and misrepresented
by them individually. (Ismael, 2002, p. 319, original emphasis)
This seems like a pretty fair description of Meyer’s possible presents too: mere
descriptions of a momentary state of affairs containing information about the
past, connected together by logical inference rather than temporal passage. And
so it seems to me that, ultimately, Meyer is to be read as denying the reality of
time in an analogous way to Barbour. This is the real reason why an accusation
of presentism would be wide of the mark: Meyer doesn’t think that time exists
at all.
However, as Meyer simply fails to consider Barbour’s relationist physics I
cannot say how closely he takes his elimination of temporal ontology to ap-
proach Barbour’s denial of time, or, indeed, similar positions motived by al-
ternative formalisms of general relativity (Earman, 2002; Rovelli, 2009). In-
stead, when Meyer comes to consider relativistic spacetime he does so equipped
with a commitment to spatial substantivalism and so an ontology of eternally
existing spatial points. He also assumes a curiously anachronistic attitude to-
wards the importance of the “reference frame,” which “can be regarded as pair
R = 〈Rs, Rt〉, where Rs encodes the prescriptions for assigning spatial coordi-
nates and Rt those for temporal coordinates” (p. 114).
Meyer claims that the argument from accepting relativistic physics to accept-
ing the metaphysical unity of space and time—the “inseparability argument”—is
inconclusive. Instead he claims that there is no reason why one cannot combine
substantivalism about space with relationism about time, or with Meyer’s own
view: “Tense operators,” he says, “are devices for drawing simple temporal co-
ordinate lines across space” (p. 129). The coordinate lines they draw depend on
the reference frame, and each choice of reference frame leads to an alternative
ersatz time series. Special relativity is to be respected by the proscription that
no particular reference frame can be privileged over another.
One of the strange aspects of this view is the idea that a choice of refer-
ence frame—an assignment of spatial and temporal coordinates—is required to
make sense of relativistic spacetime. Aside from the availability of coordinate
independent descriptions (which Meyer acknowledges and claims to be able to
recover) there is the fact that the existence of a global coordinate chart is neither
sufficient to support a (frame dependent) split of spacetime into space and time,
nor is such a split necessary to apply relativistic physics. In support of the latter
claim, consider the ‘GPS observables’ of Rovelli (2002), which have an interpre-
tation in terms of the position of four material points (i.e. GPS satellites) and do
not correspond to a foliation of spacetime into space and time (i.e. a global time
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function). In support of the former, there exists a global coordinate chart for
Go¨del spacetime—a solution of Einstein’s Equations with particularly strange
temporal properties—despite the fact it has no closed spacelike hypersurfaces
(Malament, 2012, p. 196).
I will return to Meyer’s difficulties with Go¨del spacetime in a moment, but
there is also cause for skepticism that Meyer’s reconstruction can be carried
out at all, even in the simplest of cases. Take non-relativistic Galilean (or
Neo-Newtonian) spacetime, which comes with a specification of a set of inertial
frames and a uniquely specified set of instantaneous spatial ‘slices’ but without
any particular inertial frame being privileged. In this case, Meyer’s hybrid view
says that each inertial (i.e. reference) frame describes the spatio-temporal paths
of a set of persisting material objects—substantial spatial points. According to
each of these frames, then, each of these ‘particles of space’ is at rest.
In that case, however, Meyer’s official procedure for reconstructing an er-
satz time series with non-denumerably many instants will not work. Earlier in
the book, Meyer (p. 68) considers a (non-stationary) point particle following
a continuous curve. By referring to the points of space that are occupied by
the particle at different points on the curve we can distinguish (ersatz) times.
Meyer (2009) shows that even if the formal language used to represent tensed
facts has a countable vocabulary that one can distinguish continuously many
times (by making use of Dedekind cuts). But what if the path of the particle is
stationary?
Consider a free particle with zero momentum and initial position a. The
path of the particle is given by a parameterized curve f(t) = a, for all t. Let
La be the proposition that the particle is located at a. How many ersatz times
are there? At first sight, it seems as if there is one: the time at which La is
true. However, Meyer (p. 68) does have another trick up his sleeve: a possible
present p = {La,PLa,PPLa,PPPLa, . . . } corresponds to an ersatz time series
with at least four distinct times, and one could keep on going. But there is
no way to extend this time series to a non-denumerable infinity of times by
using Meyer’s original construction, which relies on a non-denumerable infinity
of positions to escape the limitation of the language to merely countably many
names. Therefore, Meyer’s claim to be able to recover a description of an empty
spacetime by means of an ersatz time series remains unsupported.8
There are also difficulties with the other hybrid view explicitly discussed by
Meyer: the combination of temporal relationism with spatial substantivalism in
special relativity. As Meyer (p. 128) points out, the posits of Russell’s relational
theory of time are incompatible with Robb’s relativistically invariant reading
of temporal precedence () in special relativity. Meyer’s suggestion is that
the temporal relationalist should adopt a frame-relative version of temporal
8I also share Savitt’s (forthcoming) concern that a supposed ‘reconstruction’ of Minkowski
spacetime from a set of reference frames and an equivalence relation on them encoding the
symmetry group of the spacetime cannot bear the metaphysical weight attached to it by
Meyer.
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precedence, thus attributing contrary temporal relations to spacelike separated
pairs of events (with respect to some pair of inertial frames). But to do so would
betray the motivation of the project, which was to reconstruct times from an
ontology of events and their temporal relations: a temporal relation among
events is a two-place relation; it is not a three-place relation between two events
and an arbitrarily chosen reference frame.
This sort of concern may even lead one to be skeptical of Meyer’s overall
project. Meyer introduces his book as providing an answer to the question:
“What sort of things are instants of time?” (p. 1). But, according to a significant
(but, perhaps, minority) view among philosophers of physics, special relativity
teaches us that there simply are no instants of time. That is, there is no such
thing as a spatially extended temporal instant composed of coexistent events.
What underlies this claim is the idea that events are partially ordered by Robb’s
temporal precedence relation, not totally ordered. As Wu¨thrich (2010) puts it:
Special-relativistic theories admit only a partial temporal ordering
of events. The loss of absolute simultaneity leads to a loss of com-
parability: with an interpretation of the binary ordering relation as
“being earlier than or simultaneous to”—it is a temporal ordering
that we are seeking after all—pairs of spacelike related events do not
stand in this relation. (p. 260, original emphasis)
So, rather than dropping Robb’s invariant relation, we should abandon the idea
that pairs of spacelike related events can be temporally ordered, and with it the
notion of a spatially extended instant of time.
Finally, concerning the extension of Meyer’s hybrid views to general rela-
tivistic spacetimes, his success relies on the availability of a (not necessarily
unique) decomposition into time and space. And, what is more, this split must
suffice for an ontological interpretation in terms of a set of substantial spatial
points which persist through time. It seems to me that this must correspond
to a foliation of spacetime into Cauchy surfaces (spatial hypersurfaces pierced
exactly once by each inextensible causal curve). Formally, global hyperbolic-
ity provides a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a Cauchy
time function, i.e., a foliation of a relativistic spacetime M into Cauchy sur-
faces S with the structure R×S (Minguzzi and Sa´nchez, 2008, Thm. 3.75). But
global hyperbolicity lies to the strong end of causal conditions for relativistic
spacetimes. At the other end lies Go¨del spacetime.
Meyer (p. 123) admits that the existence of Go¨del spacetime as a solution
of Einstein’s Equations provides strong support for the inseparability argument
in General Relativity. I am not convinced by his response. If Go¨del spacetime
is to be admitted as a genuine physical possibility then, Meyer says,
there might only be a local way of understanding tensed sentences,
and thus only a local way of abstracting times from them. In such a
case, there would be something irreducibly ‘patchy’ about the tem-
poral aspect of reality. (Meyer, 2013, p. 131)
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Presumably Meyer means to say that, although in this case there will be no
genuine hybrid view available, if spatially extended instants of time can be
defined locally then the same construction of ersatz times can be applied and
that suffices to support his a priori commitment to the tense logic Z as a theory
of time.
Despite the existence of closed timelike curves through every point of Go¨del
spacetime, there are indeed no closed timelike nor null geodesics (Malament,
2012, p. 209). An observer following a timelike geodesic might hope, therefore,
to construct a local time series that extends at least somewhat beyond her one-
dimensional path through spacetime. She may have some limited success, but
if she attempts to follow Einstein’s clock synchronization protocol she will find
that light rays will not travel beyond the critical radius rc and, indeed, any light
ray she sends out will come back to meet her an indefinite number of times (the
‘Boomerang Effect’) (Malament, 2012, p. 207).9
More to the point, Meyer’s commitment to the tense logic Z as an a priori
theory of time makes him particularly vulnerable to a close relative of Go¨del’s
argument in favor of the ideality of time. Earman’s (1995) careful analysis of
Go¨del’s argument makes it clear that Go¨del is missing an implicit premise that
would get him to the conclusion that time in our world is ideal. Earman’s first
try at the missing premise is this:
(P7.1) The existence of an objective lapse is not a property that
time can possess contingently. (Earman, 1995, p. 197)
If this premise is true then Go¨del’s argument succeeds. Earman is not convinced
by the plausibility of this premise as he does not share the underlying intuition
that one can arrive at such truths “just by reflecting on the concept of time”
(Earman, 1995, p. 198). Meyer apparently does, however.
Recall that Meyer, in restricting his commitments to a minimal tense logic,
refuses to take a stand on whether the time series is closed or open.10 But here
we are not talking of ‘the’ time series—Go¨del spacetime presents a situation
in which that notion makes no sense at all. We must, therefore, restrict our
attention to local time series, given by timelike curves. Since these curves can
be either open or closed, such facts about the topology of time will be relative
to one’s particular path through the universe. There is, then, no knowledge to
be had about ‘time’ considered separately from spacetime.11
If our knowledge of time is to be analytic a priori, as Meyer would like,
then it is a matter of metaphysical necessity. And if we allow that General
Relativity and Einstein’s Equations provide a valid notion of physical possibility
then the possible universes they describe they must conform to those necessary
9Rindler’s (1981) distinction between ‘public’ and ‘private’ spaces in cosmological models
also seems relevant here. This is discussed (in another context) by Malament (2012, pp.
163–164).
10See for discussion of this issue (Meyer, 2013, pp. 45–47, 69–71).
11A related point is made by Earman (1972, p. 82) against the causal theories of time of
Gru¨nbaum and van Fraassen.
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truths. That is, since Go¨del spacetime is a solution of Einstein’s Equations, it
must conform to any and all metaphysical necessities. Contrapositively, if some
purported metaphysical necessity fails to hold in Go¨del spacetime then it is no
metaphysical necessity at all. The dilemma faced by Meyer is as follows: either
the interconnection of time and space in Go¨del spacetime holds necessarily, in
which case the inseparability argument goes through, or the separation of time
and space is a contingent matter, in which case there is little scope for necessary
truths about time alone.
In conclusion, I commend Meyer’s book as both a very readable, albeit
opinionated, introduction to the philosophy of time and an exemplar of the best
work in the field. However, Meyer’s hope to have given a metaphysical theory
of time that floats free of contingent matters of fact (and, indeed, physics) sits
uncomfortably with the idea that relativity theory provides valuable insights
into the nature of time, and the details of his metaphysic remain to be fleshed
out. More generally, it seems to me that analytic metaphysics still has much
to gain by adopting Quine’s naturalistic attitude of ‘no first philosophy’ and
so, when it comes to understanding the nature of time, looking first to physics
rather than language or intuitions.
Barbour, J., 1999. The End of Time. New York: Oxford University Press.
Barbour, J. B., 1982. Relational concepts of space and time. British Journal for
the Philosophy of Science 33 (3), 251–274.
Barbour, J. B., Bertotti, B., 1982. Mach’s principle and the structure of dynam-
ical theories. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London A. Mathematical
and Physical Sciences 382 (1783), 295–306.
Belot, G., 1999. Rehabilitating relationalism. International Studies in the Phi-
losophy of Science 13 (1), 35–52.
Davidson, D., 1980. Essays on Actions and Events. Clarendon Press.
Earman, J., 1972. Notes on the causal theory of time. Synthese 24 (1-2), 74–86.
Earman, J., 1995. Bangs, Crunches, Whimpers and Shrieks. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Earman, J., 2002. Thoroughly modern McTaggart or what McTaggart would
have said if he had read the general theory of relativity. Philosophers’ Imprint
2 (3), 1–28.
Ismael, J., 2002. Rememberances, mementos, and time-capsules. In: Callender,
C. (Ed.), Time, reality and experience. No. 50. Cambridge University Press,
pp. 317–329.
Malament, D. B., 2012. Topics in the foundations of general relativity and New-
tonian gravitation theory. University of Chicago Press.
Massey, G. J., 1969. Tense logic! why bother? Nouˆs, 17–32.
13
Meyer, U., 2009. Times in tense logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic
50 (2), 201–219.
Meyer, U., 2013. The Nature of Time. Oxford University Press.
Minguzzi, E., Sa´nchez, M., 2008. The causal hierarchy of spacetimes. Recent
developments in pseudo-Riemannian geometry, ESI Lectures Mathematical
Physics, 299–358.
Pooley, O., March 2001. Relationism rehabilitated? II: Relativity.
URL http://philsci-archive.pitt.edu/221/
Pooley, O., Brown, H. R., 2002. Relationalism rehabilitated? I: Classical me-
chanics. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 53 (2), 183–204.
Prior, A. N., 1957. Time and Modality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rindler, W., 1981. Public and private space curvature in robertson-walker uni-
verses. General Relativity and Gravitation 13 (5), 457–461.
Rovelli, C., Jan. 2002. GPS observables in general relativity. Physical Review
D 65 (4), 044017+.
Rovelli, C., 2009. Forget Time, FQXi Essay Competition.
URL http://arxiv.org/abs/0903.3832v3
Russell, B., 1927. The Analysis of Matter. Cambridge: Routledge.
Russell, B., 1936. On order in time. In: Proceedings of the Cambridge Philo-
sophical Society. Vol. 32. Cambridge University Press, pp. 216–228.
Savitt, S., forthcoming. Review of The Nature of Time. Mind.
van Benthem, J. F. A. K., 1983. The Logic of Time. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Whitehead, A. N., 1925. Science and the modern world. Cambridge University
Press.
Wu¨thrich, C., 2010. No presentism in quantum gravity. In: Petkov, V. (Ed.),
Space, Time, and Spacetime: Physical and Philosophical Implications of
Minkowski’s Unification of Space and Time. Vol. 167 of Fundamental Theories
of Physics. Springer, pp. 257–280.
14
